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Abstract: 
This article explores infrastructures of violence created by ongoing 
contestations around (in) security related to violent insurgency in Kenya. It 
draws on public discourses and policy responses emerging from the September 
2013 terror attack at Westgate in Nairobi, Kenya. By exploring the connection 
between public discourses on resolving (in) security, this article explores the 
security policies developed to cordon off particular geographical sites and 
construct Kenyan Somalis as the “other” ostensibly to secure the country. I argue 
that security discourses and resultant policies produce fluid security 
infrastructures. This is evident in a move from a focus on physical security 
infrastructure evident in “boots on the ground” and visible security sector 
presence, to less visible forms of security which rely to a great extent on 
surveillance both by the state and citizens.  
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Introduction 
This article emerges out of an interest in what debates about countering 
violent extremism do in societies managing contested national governance 
transitions. I explore how terror has been deployed as a lexicon by political elites 
to manage a range of governance demands from citizens. Specifically, I focus on 
the role that discourses on violent extremism have played in the development of 
security policies that have cordoned off specific geographical zones in the city 
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and/or discursively produced Kenyan Somalis as the “other” and therefore 
targets for securitization. In this regard, I am interested in the gender and class 
dynamics that produce criminalised and securitised masculinities. Security 
policies form part of mobile infrastructure thus moving attention away from only 
paying attention to the physical presence of security forces in fixed geographical 
spaces that then construct boundaries of (in)security. In focusing on mobile 
infrastructure, I engage the policy responses that discursively deploy various 
forms of surveillance as a key feature of this mobility and generate gendered 
targets of said surveillance. Kenya offers useful examples to unpack the ways in 
which the current regime creates sites of concentrated violence by security 
forces. My analysis is limited to the period 2013 – 2015, with 2013 marking the 
year when the Westgate terror attack occurred ushering in a range of security 
related discussions in the public domain that came resulted in a number of policy 
responses between 2014 and 2015. Due to my interest in discourses, I draw 
predominantly on secondary sources for my analysis. Chief among these sources 
is data generated from two social media hashtags referred to later in this article, 
analysis of speeches by President Uhuru Kenyatta on security between 2013 – 
2015 and parliamentary Hansards that cover debates on terrorism. Ultimately, I 
am interested in how the speech acts by the President result in specific policy 
responses that define the Somali community and a geographical zone 
predominantly occupied by them as a securitisation target.  
 
This article begins by exploring the historical manifestations of violent 
extremism in Kenya and the accompanying militarization in the wake of a 
specific terror event. Secondly, I am interested in drawing on the political 
uncertainties that Kenya has experienced in the period between 2013 - 2015 to 
understand the role that the threat of violent extremism has played in re-
configuring Somali identity and therein Somali masculinities. Kenya offers an 
opportunity to unpack the nexus between violent extremism, democratic re-
consolidation processes and the production of militarised ruling masculinities 
and securitized subordinated masculinities in general. In reflecting on gender, 
this article pays attention to the contested forms of male-ness that have been 
produced by the dynamics post the Westgate terror attack. I am cognizant that 
gender is co-constitutive, which means there are specific ramifications for non-
male people, specifically women, though this is not the focus of the article. This 
article analyses masculinity in the heteronormative ways in which it manifests in 
discussions on securitisation of Somali men in Kenya.  While there is an 
opportunity to challenge how hetero-patriarchy is taken as given and which 
therefore reinforces performances of ruling masculinity, this does not fall within 
the scope of this article and is therefore not explored. 
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Conceptual Notes 
This article draws on two main conceptual frameworks to respond to the 
questions above. The first framework is an extension of the work of Mary 
Douglas1 on boundaries and embodiment.  In this article, I used boundaries in 
two ways. The first way is to refer to the physical markers of boundaries across 
territories which are evident in infrastructure such as railway lines that divide 
industry (the workers) and sites of capital (those who manage the money) and 
therefore the people who cut across these divides on a daily basis2. The roads 
(poorly constructed and badly networked) and/or under-developed public 
transport systems determine how people negotiate the city for employment and 
living arrangements. Like other major cities across the globe, these boundaries 
across city landscapes are racialised and serve as a key marker of class 
distinctions. Consequently, the geographical landscapes that arise out of physical 
infrastructure offer a master narrative of a place. Geographical landscapes define 
what is inscribed as official memory, which is often represented through 
development plans and visions. Underlying the master narrative is evidence of 
anxiety about managing boundary porosity, which is linked to policing bodies 
that are perceived as likely to “pollute” the zones that are being safeguarded. 
Couched in developmental language around progress and managing poverty, 
zoning, housing and security arrangements are created but they silence the oft-
violent ways in which these forms of progress are experienced by those on the 
periphery. 
 
The notion of porosity is linked to the second way I use boundary and that 
is through a focus on gendered bodies. In this regard, I am interested in 
Douglas’s ideas about purity and danger. Douglas constructs the body as a 
complex structure, asserting that the power and danger credited to social 
structures of power are reproduced on the human body3. I draw on Douglas 
ideas on porosity of bodies and danger for my analysis of Kenya by focusing on 
the discursive production of Somali masculinities as dangerous. Yuval Davis and 
Kandiyoti note that when societies are at threat due to war or conflict, the 
management of death and life during war or peace rests on managing ideas 
about femininity and masculinity4. Douglas suggests that whenever lines of 
security are precarious, such as those that offer the potential to collapse notions 
of shared national or community identity, discourses about pollution come to the 
support of those claiming their own identities against ‘others’5. I extend Douglas 
analysis by examining how death and incarceration become rituals through 
which political regimes manage pollution and “purify” societies of dangerous and 
contagious populations. The boundary anxiety produced by the need to manage 
porous bodies ostensibly to produce a stable Kenyan in the light of the threat 
both real and perceived of violent extremism is key to my analysis.  
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My analysis of purity, porosity and danger is complemented by Kopano 
Ratele’s concept of ruling masculinity.6 Ratele’s work on understanding males 
who are powerless in relation to other males but are members of a powerful 
group in the context of hetero-patriarchy is useful to my examination of Somali 
masculinities in Kenya. Ratele uses the categories of age and income, which I will 
draw on, as a basis to examine the relationship of non-hegemonic males to 
reigning ideas of male-ness. In this case, this article examines young Somali 
men’s relationships to security actors and the Kenyan regime. Using space and 
time this article examines the evolution of young Somali men’s relationship to 
various Kenyan regimes. This article analyses how the construction of non-
hegemonic ruling masculinity is constructed through securitised discourses of 
Somalis as a community and often visualized through Somali male youth. The 
construction of hegemonic masculinity through both speech acts and 
performances of military leadership through the incumbent president are 
designed to project safety and strength, at the same time that Somali 
masculinities are subordinated and securitised along age, class and racialized 
lines in the country.  
 
The construction of masculinities and how these are mobilized to manage 
the danger associated with porosity of boundaries as articulated above is 
anchored on Buzan’s work on securitization. In this article I draw on two aspects 
of securitisation theory, the first is the central argument that connects speech 
acts by a security actor to their ability to claim a right to extraordinary measures 
to tackle an issue thus moving it out of the realm of normal politics into an extra-
ordinary realm of political procedure7. For Kenya, the evolution of violent 
extremism policy responses and public discourse around it can be traced to 
speech acts of the President most notably those which launched Kenya’s military 
incursion into Somalia in 2011 ostensibly to “protect Kenya”. However, this 
article is concerned with the escalation of regime responses to violent extremism 
since 2013, that have relied on arguing for normal rules and regulations of law 
and policy making to be side stepped to enable an effective Executive response.8 
This article does not suggest that terrorism is not a self-evident security concern, 
rather, securitization theory draws attention to the exceptionality attached to a 
securitization move, which results in a shift in “business as usual” when dealing 
with the issue that is securitised. It is the consequences of the suspension in 
rules due to securitization on a specific section of Kenyans that this article 
examines. Here Huysmans’s expansion of securitization to an examination of 
practices and devices becomes important to how I think about securitization 
beyond the discursive9.  
 
The second component of securitization that is essential to the analysis in 
this article is the notion of societal security, which is when societies perceive 
threats in identity terms. Buzan identifies the process of establishing the “other” 
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as essential to the construction of an identity based threat10. Waever asserts that 
in the absence of the “other” one cannot speak about security. Therefore, societal 
securitisation is rooted in the identity politics of self and “other”, with the 
enemy-other often identified as another society or an ethnic group, and the 
security of one means insecurity of the other11. Consequently, societal survival 
may be sought at expense of others, particularly when “others” are presented as 
an existential threat to a society’s identity. In linking the two articulations of 
securitization above, this article argues that the securitization move made to deal 
with terrorism in Kenya, provided cause for the regime to exercise extraordinary 
security measures, which in this case was accompanied by societal securitization 
of the Somali community. The process of securitizing the Somali as a community 
can be traced to the creation of boundaries for security operations, which collide 
with areas predominantly occupied by Somali Kenyans. In addition, through 
speech acts of the President and influential politicians allied to the current 
Kenyan regime, a direct link is made between Somali identity and terror thus 
legitimizing in some quarters the securitization of this community. In this article, 
I make a connection between Buzan and Waever’s ideas of societal securitization 
to Douglas conceptualization of boundary anxieties. Douglas thinks about 
boundary anxieties as generated by societal threats being mapped onto 
gendered bodies that are considered porous and therefore risky. Ratele’s 
analysis of masculinities extend the gendered analysis of porosity and danger 
developed by Douglas to assess the implications of Somali societal securitisation 
on the production of masculinities.  
 
Geographies of Violence  
On 1st April 2017, a cellphone video was circulated across most Kenyan 
social networking sites12. In it, a plain clothes policeman is captured confronting 
and shooting an unarmed man, who appears roughed up since his clothes are 
half torn and he is bleeding. All of this occurs in front of a crowd of onlookers. 
The shooter appears undisturbed by his audience as he stops to get another 
loaded gun from a man we assume to be a police officer before firing the bullet 
that eventually kills the man who is lying on the ground. Within the video frame 
lies another dead body that a viewer can assume was a victim of extra-judicial 
killing by the same officer. It is evident that the person recording these deaths is 
conscious of the (in) dignity of the public spectacle surrounding these murders 
because they zoom out when the shots are fired. These deaths occurred in 
Eastleigh, Nairobi. After initially challenging the authenticity of the video, the 
Kenyan police service eventually confirmed that the executioner was a police 
officer and the two young men were apparently members of a well-known 
criminal gang13.  
 
This example illustrates the ways in which specific geographical areas in 
Kenya have become sites for normalized security operations. The logic of this 
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normalization is rooted in a political environment in which the securitization of 
terror has enabled cordoning of specific sites and therefore communities as 
legitimate targets of security based harassment. National security concerns 
generated by violent extremism provide room for the justification of extra-
judicial killings, publicly articulated as evidence of a regime in charge of security 
matters.14 The construction of Eastleigh as it emerges in discussions on terror in 
Kenya as a hub for terrorists leads to the justification of certain “security” actions 
as plausible in this area without attention to the rule of law. The rationale for 
Eastleigh as a “free zone” for extra-judicial security action is anchored in its 
construction as a porous geographical location that needs to be securitised in 
order to be effectively brought under “Kenyan” control. In addition, the 
securitization of Eastleigh is connected to the regime linking the “danger” in it to 
one associated with the porosity of Somali identity in Kenya. This dual 
construction of the site Eastleigh and Somali societal identity as requiring 
securitisation has been bolstered by  speech acts by security officials who draw 
their mandate from Presidential direction that construct Somalis as “other” – 
foreigners, illegal immigrants, refugees.15  
 
The porosity and danger associated with Somali identity in Kenya is not a 
2013 occurrence, there are historical antecedents located in Kenya’s complicated 
colonial and post-colonial history with Somali Kenyans. In sum, these are located 
in two processes, the frustration of historical efforts to pursue a greater Pan 
Somali vision that sought to unite Somali occupied zones and an accompanying 
process of socio-economic and political exclusion by both the colonial and post-
colonial regimes. At the beginning of the Lancaster House talks on Kenya's 
independence Constitution, a delegation of Somali leaders stated their desire to 
have NFD secede to Somalia to join the Greater Somalia, which would encompass 
all those areas in which people of Somali origin were found. Greater Somalia 
would therefore span Somalia, Somaliland, Ogaden in Ethiopia, North Eastern 
Kenya and Djibouti16.  
 
While the desire to create a Pan Somali region emerged from the havoc 
that arbitrary and artificial colonial arrangements wreaked in Africa, it was also 
exacerbated by the exclusion and under-development that framed the Northern 
Frontier District (NFD) as it was called then. The British colonial government 
approached the NFD as an area that needed to be circumscribed by instituting 
the Outlying District Ordinance of 1902, which restricted both residents' 
movement and the relationship of the centre - Nairobi. Additional legislation, 
which included, the Special Districts (Administration) Ordinance of 1934 and the 
Stock Theft and Produce Ordinance of 1933, gave colonial administrators 
extensive powers of arrest, restraint, detention, and seizure of property of 
'hostile tribes'17. Jomo Kenyatta’s post-independence regime sustained the use of 
draconian colonial laws in addition to new legislation that gave power to rule the 
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region by decree and enlarged emergency powers. The government imposed 
emergency rule in the region that led to decades of state harassment, which 
included Somali leaders being routinely placed in extended 'preventive 
detention', the creation of protected villages and continued restriction of entry 
and exit into the region18. The post-Kenyatta regime did not alter the status quo. 
In November 1980, government authorities massacred approximately 3000 
ethnic Somalis of Bulla Kartasi and around 5000 of the Degodia Somali sub-clan 
were killed at Wagalla airstrip in February 1984, in what is now known as the 
Wagalla Massacre19 Emergency laws governing the region were only lifted in 
1992, the same year that ushered a return to multi-party democracy after close 
to thirty years of a single party regime by Kenyatta and later Daniel Moi. The 
construction of Somalis in particular as shiftas – bandits, militias, means that the 
state inscribed in law and practice that this was a community that would be 
subject to exceptional rules, with limited legibility as citizens. 
 
The impact of the historical juridical and de facto segregation of North 
Eastern Kenya has had specific ramifications for the relationship between 
extremist insurgency, exclusion and boundary control. One of the persistent 
complaints from residents in North Eastern Kenya concerns the difficulties 
associated with acquiring national identity cards, which has relied on extra 
vetting of residents of the region. While specific data is hard to come by, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that those with Islamic names generally requiring 
additional rigorous vetting in order to acquire identity cards than those with 
Kenyan or European names20. The insistence on vetting Somalis as a security 
measure has created room for corruption since government authorities rely on 
local elders to determine the authenticity of the claimants, a process that is open 
to manipulation21. These historical exclusionary approaches re-surfaced as part 
of a broader security narrative around managing the extremist group Al Shabaab 
in the Horn of Africa. The security narrative reproduced in public discourses 
position Somali Kenyans as refugees, foreigners, criminals, the source of Islamic 
radicalization and Al Shabaab recruitment. 22  However, state absence has 
provided room for radical groups such as Al Shabaab to mobilize exclusion its 
advantage. 
 
The rise of Al Shabaab in particular, can be traced to the forced 
dissolution of the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia in 2007 as part of a longer 
trajectory of state fragility informed by a range of military interventions over the 
last two decades.23 Due to its proximity, Kenya has felt the impact of Somali’s 
state fragility and has played the role of a host nation for fleeing Somali citizens. 
There are subsidiary impact factors such as the flow of small arms and light 
weapons into the country due to weak boundary management, but central to this 
article is Kenya’s history as an American ally that has resulted in a long list of 
collateral terror attacks by various extremist groups as far back as the well 
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publicised attack on the American embassy in Nairobi in August 199824.  In 2011, 
Kenya launched a military operation in Somalia called Operation Linda Nchi 
(protect the country) was framed as an effort to secure Kenya’s borders and 
territorial integrity. The military operation was informed by an increase in Al 
Shabaab attacks on bars in downtown Nairobi, to crowded bus termini and 
churches with the majority of their casualties and targets have been civilians at 
25.9% with military targets constituting 22.4%.25However, in framing Al 
Shabaab’s access to Kenya as externally generated in Somalia, the Kenyan regime 
ignored the existence of sleeper cells in Kenya, which has led to an increase in 
local radicalization rather than an overt Al Shabaab presence. An expansion in 
youth radicalization to include Kenyans of non-Somali descent draws attention 
to broader socio-economic inequalities.26 In addition, the trends in youth 
radicalization evident in the presence of sleeper cells in Kenya also highlight the 
danger that is erroneously mapped on Somali bodies thereby erasing broader 
discontent in the country27.  
 
Re-defining security boundaries 
 
“Security is a shared mandate of all people living in Kenya. The first rule of 
security is vigilance” – President Kenyatta.  
 
The September 2013 Westgate mall attack in Kenya, was considered 
significant in comparison to previous Al Shabaab claimed attacks, largely due to 
its target an upmarket mall, that epitomised the convergence of economic and 
political elite interests, given that a number of political leaders had relatives in 
the mall during the attack, some of whom died28. The mall was also symbolic of 
freedom and prosperity associated with neo-liberal economic development 
rhetoric, the free market, hard work, entrepreneurship, global citizenship and 
aspiration as the core drivers of change that will upset inequality. The symbolic 
and economic factors that define what Westgate stood for are critical to how the 
responses to the terror attack evolved into a geographical, class based response 
to defining extremists and their sites of operation. 
 
Kenyans who frequented the mall performed equality because it was a 
place of aspiration. Yet, Westgate in effect represented the class divide created 
by capital given its location across the city in an area associated with the up and 
coming middle class. In addition, its employees were largely young people from 
low income families living on either side of the highway – Waiyaki way – east of 
Nairobi or the West of it. Socio-economic inequalities lead to various 
manifestations of contradictory gendered (in) security, which are sustained by 
an underlying hetero-patriarchal system. For instance, the stark reality that 
women and men will navigate physical spaces based on different bodily 
autonomy threats even where class positions are shared. The fact that public 
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transport systems are unsafe spaces for women and this is heightened 
depending on the time of the day yet income inequalities demand vast travel 
distances across the city for employment heightens precarious work conditions 
as well as greater exit for women out of employment arrangements such as wait 
staff jobs thus increasing women’s income inequality. 29 The Westgate attack 
therefore became a pivotal moment in shaping debates on national security and 
the accompanying infrastructure despite the fact that Kenya’s history with terror 
related attacks goes back to a 1975 bus park attack.30  
  
When it became evident that the attack at Westgate was not a violent 
robbery gone wrong but a deliberate attack by individuals allied to Al Shabaab, a 
number of discursive tropes emerged that begun to build a rationale for carving 
out specific geographical locations as targets for state violence. There are two 
that I want to focus on. The first trope, was the immediate effort to corral unity 
through the hashtag #WeAreOne on Twitter and its use to rally a Nairobi based 
blood drive due to the large number of victims. Accompanying the hashtag was 
the use of the flag and the city-scape as symbol of unity. Through the blood drive 
citizens mobilized the idea of a unified nation- state and therefore used grief and 
tragedy to erase albeit temporarily the fact Kenya before Westgate was a country 
struggling with a range of socio-economic and political inequalities31. The 
symbolism of blood during this period can also be viewed as part of a process of 
re-purifying the porous Kenyan borders tainted by the Al Shabaab attack thus re-
consolidating a national identity.  However, the Westgate tragedy corralled a 
false unity, by constructing an “us” versus “them”. The discursive mobilization of 
a united Kenya through the social media hashtag #WeAreOne and its translation 
into action through a massive blood drive, food donations and free counseling 
support for survivors of the attack was an essential part of creating a broader 
national psyche that facilitated an acceptance of the suspension of the rule of law 
when it came to the policy options in response to terror32.  I argue that an 
acquiescence to a suspension in the rule of law was only in some sections of the 
Kenyan public. The debate generated under the hashtag 
#KasaraniConcentrationCamp and the counter-advocacy that emerged from it as 
a direct response to the extraordinary measures taken by the regime will be 
explored in the section that follows. The regime’s policy responses demonstrated 
that this was not only the securitisation of terror but also the securitisation of an 
identity– Somali identity.  
 
Nationalism and Securitisation Policies 
 
The historical legacies of a securitized community as explored earlier in 
this article found continuity post-Westgate in two specific policy responses that 
led to the continued discursive production of Somali identity as one that needed 
to be securitized through boundary management. These policy responses are 
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Operation Usalama Watch that led to #KasaraniConcentrationCamp and the 
Security (Amendment) Laws 2014. Securitization of Somali identity through the 
boundary management of Eastleigh manifested in the surveillance of Somali men 
and the production of Somali masculinities as distinctly linked to terror. This 
section illustrates the ways in which policy followed geographical boundaries 
and was linked to othering a community. I bring together Buzan and Waever’s 
ideas on the securitization of a society33, Douglas articulation of gendered bodies 
becoming containers for the construction of porosity and danger and the 
physical construction of threat boundaries as evidenced by the geographical 
specificity of both operations. Finally, Ratele’s conceptualisation of non-
hegemonic masculinities connects class, race and age to the construction of 
Somali masculinities emerging from the security policies implemented in areas 
predominantly occupied by Somalis. 
 
In thinking about the connection between speech acts and policy, it is 
critical to point out that the process of developing policies is by no means linear. 
A rational choice approach to policy making34 has long since been debunked 
given that multiple interests influence the policy making process at any given 
time. This is further complicated when it comes to security policies since most of 
these decisions lie with institutions whose operations lie outside public scrutiny. 
For instance, the National Security Council is the key decision making organ on 
security in Kenya with its membership and deliberations are highly restricted. 
This background is critical to locating the speech acts and resultant policy 
positions explored in this section. The central point is that these statements 
cannot be read on their own but must be understood within a larger policy 
making environment in which both internal and external actors influence 
decisions. Second, the excerpts examined below from a presidential speech, a 
parliamentary discussion and the outcomes of a joint parliamentary committee 
report represent only part of the picture and are not in any way indicative of a 
linear decision making process and/or a comprehensive overview of the 
multiplicity of debates on the subject. What these excerpts do for the purposes of 
this article is illustrate certain patterns associated with the identification of the 
sites of security threats and the arrogation of additional power to specific 
institutions. 
The first excerpt below is taken from a speech by President Kenyatta on 
the evening of 21st September 2013 as the Westgate attack unfolded in Nairobi. 
The second excerpt is from a 2013 joint parliamentary committee set up to 
investigate security operations at Westgate and provide recommendations on 
how to improve the country’s security response to emergencies and terrorist 
attacks. While both are self-explanatory, the first excerpt below alludes to the 
discretionary measures taken by the Executive to empower the security agencies 
to act decisively on matters related to terror and others so long as they were 
perceived as a security threat. Using the Westgate terror attack, the President 
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side stepped the oversight and accountability mechanisms created after the 
2008 post-election crisis which were designed to reform the police service that 
historically exercised power extra-judicially to the detriment of human rights35.  
 
I have directed security agencies to be decisive in their response to this or 
any other threat. They must and will do this to demonstrate our 
constitution's categorical guarantee of Kenyans' indivisible rights to life 
and property. Across the country, we have tightened security but I urge 
all of you to remain calm and vigilant36 - President Uhuru Kenyatta, 21st 
September 2013 
 
The security directive of the President above post Westgate in addition to 
the national effect of the terror attack generated Parliamentary debate about 
accountability and a “stronger” security response. A Joint parliamentary 
committee was tasked with investigating the security response to the attack 
ostensibly to ensure that security loopholes were sealed and individuals held 
responsible. These investigations led to the head of the intelligence service 
resigning. While the findings of the committee illustrated in part below were 
contested by Kenyans37, the report was adopted and its findings found home in a 
series of policy directions that were later reported on in the President’s state of 
the nation address, in the section that follows38.   
 
Declaring war against Al Shabaab wherever they are. That the war against 
terrorism should be intensified within and outside the country. 
Investigating lapses in the country’s security agencies. Radical surgery in 
the Department of Immigration Services as well as holding the 
Department of Immigration Services, the Registration of Persons 
Department, the National Registration Bureau and the Department of 
Refugee Affairs accountable for compromising national security. 
Repealing of the Refugee Act of 200639 - Joint Parliamentary Committee 
Report, December, 2013 
There is a connection between the Executive and the role of parliament in 
cushioning the Executive’s decision in legislative might. The fact that the regime 
had a majority in parliament cannot be under-estimated here for its mobilisation 
power. The recommendations from the parliamentary report are critical here 
because their broad framing facilitated the Security Laws amendments and 
Usalama Watch. Additionally, the parliamentary report findings created room for 
the commencement of construction of a wall on the border of Somali and Kenya, 
attempts to close the oldest and largest refugee camp in Kenya – Dadaab, and a 
crackdown on a Somali owned international money transfer system Dahaabshil 
which continued the larger surveillance of Somalis40. 
Identity and Boundaries: Eastleigh and Somali-ness 
 
 The ground for Operation Usalama Watch and the Security (Amendment) 
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Laws, 2014 was laid in the President’s state of the nation address in 2014, 
excerpts below. 
 
Last year’s evil terrorist attack, among the worst in Kenyan history, 
forcefully reminded us of these facts. I stood before the nation, and vowed 
that we would not be cowed or divided. Our response was firm, without 
threatening the bonds of brotherhood that hold between our different 
faiths. Under extreme provocation, the unity of the nation was preserved. 
My government has laid a firm base for the protection of our people and 
their property.  […] My government has also invested heavily in 
surveillance equipment, and at least 1200 vehicles for our police. We will 
also substantially increase police numbers, which have already 
significantly progressed from one police officer for 750 citizens to1:535. 
These, and more, will be underpinned by the most extensive new 
investment in security since independence. My government will allocate 
resources adequate to the needs of our security agencies, the better to 
modernise them, and enable them meet current and emerging threats to 
our safety – Uhuru Kenyatta, State of the Nation address, March 201441 
 
On April 5, 2014, 6,000 police were deployed to Nairobi’s Eastleigh 
neighborhood to “arrest foreign nationals who were in the country unlawfully 
and anyone suspected of terrorist links”42. This operation was called Operation 
Usalama (safety) Watch. The security operation predominantly affected Somalis, 
Somali Kenyans, Ethiopians, South Sudanese, and Kenyan Muslim population. 
About 1,000 Somalis were arrested in a two-day police operation in Nairobi’s 
Eastleigh suburb and were taken to Kasarani Stadium outside Nairobi.43 The 
operation, which was authorised by President Uhuru Kenyatta was aimed at 
“cleaning up” Eastleigh of illegal immigrants44. In the process, the government 
reprised the historical narrative that associated terror and illegality to Somali 
identity. Cleaning up Eastleigh was intimately connected to the notion of 
porosity and purity. Porosity in connection to physical boundaries and the 
inability to track the movement of Somali citizens in particular because of the 
existence of a Somali-Kenyan community. Tracking Somalis is not only linked to 
larger nation-state conversations about managing boundaries and migration but 
is also about security risks associated with the protracted conflict in Somalia. 
Combined with the border porosity, the Somali nation’s impurity was also linked 
to the associative “stain” of Al Shabaab. Patriotism was therefore mobilized to 
ascertain cleanliness and entrench citizen-led surveillance as a way to secure the 
country. Good Somali’s versus bad Somalis. Kenyan-Somalis versus the “others” 
were evident in the proof sought by security personnel.  
 
The police used a language test to distinguish the good Somalis from the 
“bad Somalis” – bad Somalis here are those in the country illegally, refugees 
living outside refugee camps and Al Shabaab sympathisers. The police argued 
that the ability to speak Kiswahili was a good indicator of Kenyan-ness, thus 
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serving as a cleaning mechanism45. The use of Kiswahili as a screening 
mechanism resulted in many Somali women being held as illegal immigrants46. 
This approach demonstrated how such tests ignore the ways in which immigrant 
communities or those who are under siege rely on distinct gendered 
public/private binaries to retain notions of nation-hood and identity47. In these 
cases, the domestic home-making sphere is occupied by women and the public, 
employment and economic space is occupied by men. In addition, language as a 
screening approach also ignored the nature of Eastleigh as a space within which 
the Somali community in particular has re-forged national identity in the face of 
state surveillance.48 The re-constitution of Somali identity is linked to the extra 
vetting required of Somalis in order to acquire national identity cards49. An 
identity card represents ‘proof’ of Kenyan citizenship without which an 
individual cannot vote, purchase property, access higher education or even 
obtain employment. For Somali Kenyans, the precarious relationship of 
belonging with the Kenyan state has led to Kiswahili being understood as a 
language of trade and not one that defines belonging. Underlying the 
mobilization of the knowledge of Kiswahili as proof of distinction between 
Somali-Kenyans and Somalis, the police were also corralling the idea of inter-
marriage as an important way of demonstrating assimilation in Kenya. 
Intermarriage with “locals” – the authentic Kenyans would ensure Kiswahili 
uptake and consequently reduce the danger of Somali community50. Through 
inter-marriage the danger posed by Somali identity would be purified by blood 
(children) rituals. Whether it is Somalis marrying in or Kenyans “marrying out”, 
women’s reproductive capacities are mobilised to manage porosity of Somali 
identities that were now framed as dangerous in light of violent extremism. 
  
The notion of marriage and purity generated a heightened sense of 
nationalism that was critical to the distinction between “us” from “them”. Family 
values were key to screening in Usalama Watch through notions of marriage and 
child birth in addition to providing space to centre women’s maternal role in 
national efforts to countering violent extremism. In doing so, these programmes 
emphasized the Somali woman’s role as a mother, as influencers and community 
peacebuilders within the domestic sphere.51 The sphere of engagement was 
distinct, with men tasked to engage religious leaders whilst the women were 
asked to provide tighter surveillance of their son’s movements52. So even where 
efforts are made to recognise women’s agency, women get re-centered as 
mothers whose role in the domestic sphere is more important to prevention, 
rather than a willingness to engage the factors that are shaping the increased 
radicalisation of young women.  In addition, the focus on women through the 
restrictive boundaries of domesticity leads to new recruits to extremist groups 
being considered an anomaly, which means that women as active agents in 
extremist groups are ignored53.  
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Finally, if the operation alone did not demonstrate the geographical and 
communal specificity, public conversations under the hashtag 
#KasaraniConcentrationCamp illustrated how Somali masculinities were being 
redefined in the face of terrorism. #KasaraniConcentrationCamp emerged out of 
events reports under Operation Usalama Watch in social and mainstream media, 
particularly when it became apparent that hundreds of Somalis were being 
rounded up and held illegally at the Kasarani Sports Stadium54. The debates 
under this hashtag revealed the convergence between the securitization of terror 
being leveraged to securitise a community. The argument that refugees and out 
of status residents could only be resident in Eastleigh thus providing a rationale 
for this targeted security operation, played into the historical exclusion that has 
traditionally labelled Somalis as external and othered in the Kenyan state. The 
mobilization of the imagery of a concentration camp in social media served the 
function of highlighting the illegality of the state’s security operation. It was also 
a reminder of the suspension of legality where Somalis as a community are 
concerned through 1960s emergency laws that allowed security officials to act 
outside the rule of law55. Additionally, the images of the holding cells in 
makeshift cages also drew attention to the existential threat now facing a 
community under the guise of fighting terror56. In securitizing Somali identity 
through security policies developed due to terror, the Kenyan state positioned 
itself as the other – in relation to the Somali self which was at threat. Sections of 
the Kenyan public considered the regime’s actions legitimate because it was seen 
as evidence of “taking charge” of a greater, national security threat57. An excerpt 
from a parliamentary debate on the nature of the regime’s responses to terror 
illustrates this desire for decisive action from the government: 
 
I want us to borrow from the US experience. Congress rallied around 
President Bush notwithstanding political affiliations. I want to challenge 
this House: Let us rally around the Commander-In-Chief. However, let me 
also challenge the Commander-In-Chief: Come to this House with some 
very bold measures which can enable us to hand you full authority to 
deploy the full arsenal of the Commander-In- Chief, including zone 
declaration of state of emergency. We can zone this country and identify 
places that must be placed under special attention and special action. As 
we do that, I hope that hon. Members of this House will not go out there, if 
your constituency is among the special zones, to start screaming: “My 
people are being finished.” This is not about your people. This is about 
Kenya and security. – Ababu Namwamba, MP. 14th April 201558  
 
Gendered Bodies and the Logic of Violence 
The underlying logic of violence illustrated above was one that linked it to 
ensuring security and was also evident in the carte blanche given to the police by 
the regime to deal with “terrorists”. This arrogation of power is grounded in the 
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securitisation move that led to a suspension of rules in order to deal with this 
new security challenge. The suspension of rules in Kenya’s case occurred 
through amendments in laws. On December 11, 2014, the Parliamentary 
Committee on National Security and Administration submitted the Security Laws 
(Amendment) Bill, 2014 to parliament59. The bill consisted of wide ranging 
amendments to 21 laws. Notable here are Articles 62 through 66 of the bill that 
amended the National Intelligence Security Act by broadening the powers of 
security officials. The bill expanded the powers of the National Intelligence 
Service (NIS) to stop and detain suspects, search and seize private property, and 
monitor communications without a court warrant. By significantly expanding the 
powers of intelligence officers, which had been withdrawn in the 1990s after a 
history of torture of political activists and detention without trial it mobilized the 
exceptional the securitization of terror as a basis for action. Specifically, Article 
18, enables police to extend pre-charge detention for up to 90 days with court 
authorization, well beyond the 24-hour limit that Kenyan law currently allows. 
Article 19, allows prosecutors to not disclose evidence to the accused if “the 
evidence is sensitive and not in the public interest to disclose.” Article 62 
authorizes NIS officers to “do anything necessary to preserve national security” 
and to detain people even on suspicion of “engaging in any act or thing or being 
in possession of anything which poses a threat to national security.” Article 66, 
enables NIS officers to carry out “covert operations,” broadly defined as 
“measures aimed at neutralizing threats against national security.” On December 
19th 2014, the president signed the bill into law.  
These speech acts as previously mentioned produced a number of policy 
shifts, some discussed in this article, under whose cover wide ranging security 
actions are taken60. Core to these policies is the public performance of extra-
judicial killings as a symbol of state action. The Independent Medical Legal Unit 
(IMLU) recorded the following extra-judicial killings in 2014/2015 by city and 
gender. It is worth noting that these numbers are likely to be an under-estimate. 
The total number of cases documented by IMLU in 2014 is thirty-four. Out of this 
number, twenty-nine were male and five female. IMLU further documented extra 
judicial executions from January to December 2015 with twenty-three male and 
four female victims.61 Unchecked extra-judicial killings contribute to sustaining a 
narrative of poor, marginalized young men as violent and criminal thereby 
narrowly viewing their marginality in society as created by crime and not the 
circumstances that generate violence associated with crime. 
 
The regime instead of addressing the dynamics that increase socio-
economic inequalities across groups, uses police brutality, which leads to a self-
fulfilling prophecy of young poor men in the margins of Nairobi as a problem and 
a target of (in)security 62. This criminalizing has an impact on the production of 
gender relations in these communities. The relationship between the police and 
marginalized communities such as those in Eastleigh is one based on mistrust 
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and extortion63. This means that the police are generally unavailable to respond 
to crimes in these communities, instead they are viewed as a source of crime. By 
securitizing terror post-Westgate and Somalis, the state defined a hierarchy of 
violence. Complimenting this underlying logic of violence is the performance of 
militarized masculinity by President Uhuru Kenyatta. This is a development that 
serves the pursuit of military symbols as reflective of control, order and 
authority.  As a civilian head of state providing civilian oversight to the military, 
Mr. Kenyatta’s insistence on wearing full military fatigues when attending 
military functions and/or visiting Somalia is at odds with military code of 
conduct regarding civilians wearing military uniforms. Uniforms in general and 
military uniform in particular, serve a specific function in a context where the 
military is the ultimate symbol of the monopoly of the means of violence. The 
military uniform reflects order and discipline, and calls for subordination by 
displaying a variety of insignia, including badges that indicate rank and 
emphasize the hierarchical structure of armies. The uniform through 
differentiation is intended to ensure respect and fear and symbolizes strength 
and power. Most military uniforms include features designed to make its wearer 
appear broader or taller, and thus to enhance the soldiers’ stature in the eyes of 
comrades, civilians and the enemy64.  
Uhuru Kenyatta’s periodic appearance in full military gear particularly 
when in conversation with the nation on Al Shabaab or security related matters 
serves two main purposes. The first purpose is to project militarized masculinity 
in order to enable a larger conversation about safety, security and control 
amongst sections of his supporters. The second is a discursive continuity of 
securitization speech acts that link assertions about the risk that young Somali 
men pose to the security of the nation. This is evident in the distinction made 
between the President speaking as a civilian leader and when he speaks as the 
commander in chief of the armed forces and therefore wielding legitimate 
control over the use of force. The context within which securitisation speech acts 
occur link Al Shabaab, Somali identity and policy responses around Somali 
securitisation therefore positions this particular act as a projection of ruling 
masculinity. The relationship between this performance of ruling masculinity 
and young Somali men in this instance, who are targeted by security sweeps, 
reprises the historical relationship between Somalis and various regimes.  A 
relationship that has been characterised by violence and surveillance as the 
primary way in which discussions about Somali positionality is negotiated with 
the Kenyan state. Ratele's variables of analysis of age and income are critical 
here because while there is a generic articulation of “Somalis” as a problem – 
Somali elite are not targeted and neither are young Somali men who come from 
fairly affluent backgrounds affected by securitisation. The combination of age 
and class dynamics are critical here to understanding why ruling militarise 
masculinity becomes an important part of the discursive construction of young, 
poor Somali men as non-hegemonic. The President’s military dress is a 
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performative ritual act that is designed to communicate authority, demand 
respect in an environment in which the average Kenyan believes that his 
government’s control on security matters is shaky at best65. It also centres a 
narrative about national security and territoriality that is anchored in military 
imagery and its institutional power.  
 
Conclusion 
As noted at the beginning of this article, the Kenyan case study offered an 
opportunity to situate the duality theorized by securitisation scholars namely – 
speech acts by powerful security actors as a securitisation move that leads to 
extraordinary often extra-judicial measures around an issue and the 
securitization of identity, which in this case is linked to what was obviously a 
security question – terror. Securitisation theorists argue that it is not enough for 
a speech act naming an existential threat to occur but that it has to be 
accompanied by acceptance from an audience. The securitisation of violent 
extremism and the accompanying process of legitimizing Somalis as targets post-
Westgate, demonstrate the centrality of coercion and legitimate fear of violence 
from external, faceless attackers – Al Shabaab - to mobilise broad based public 
sentiment towards the inevitability of force. The relationship between speech 
acts by the President in this case, reinforced through other institutions with legal 
capabilities such as parliament, coerce acceptance by an audience in this case the 
Kenyan public. Coercion relies not only on the exceptional nature of the threat 
identified, which in this case is violent extremism but also on the abrogation of 
systems of power to mobilise said support. In paying attention to how 
discourses, speech acts evolve, this article moves beyond the use of legal means 
and the clear fact of violent extremism as a security issue, as the only basis on 
which exceptionalism and securitisation is instituted. It expands on 
securitisation of identity by examining how military and security outcomes are 
generated by supporting discourses that sustain the balkanisation of historically 
excluded geographical zones and communities. To do this, the regime 
reproduces troops and war as ways to rally citizens around the war effort and 
the “enemy” draws on nationalistic dimensions that involve linking ruling 
militarized masculinity to honour, respectability and safety. Ruling masculinities 
in Kenya circle around confrontation, rather than knowledge which is illustrated 
in the mobility that terror narratives have in enabling the regime to securitise, 
ghettoise and criminalise non-hegemonic Somali masculinities. 
 
Securitisation acts rely on an element of supra-legality that allows the 
Executive to abrogate power to the exclusion of other arms of government. 
Kenya’s history with an over-centralised presidential system which was over-
hauled with the re-entry of multi-party politics in 1992, situates the 
exceptionalism required by the current regime to address violent extremism in 
the realm of freedom reversals. However, as has been noted in this article the 
 18 
legibility of Somali lives has always been securitised. However, the moments 
analyses in this article demonstrate that terror has not only provided room to re-
securitise Somalis but also rendered it a threat and threatened its survival 
through policy responses that geographically and physically target them as part 
of dealing with terror. There are tensions between those who consider the 
regime’s responses as justifiable routes to dealing with terror and Somalis as 
collateral damage who have simply been criminalised and those who view the 
regime’s actions as a deliberate - even if not named as such – assault on Somalis 
as a nation. The inconsistency in security speech acts that oscillate between 
asserting that policy responses are not about Somalis and their actions 
demonstrating the opposite as seen in #KasaraniConcentrationCamp do not 
illustrate the absence of a securitising move on Somalis. Rather, it points to the 
mobility and ambiguity of security policies developed to deal with terrorism. The 
ambiguity is occasioned by the position that terrorism is not a religious or a 
community specific problem but one that is more agile and thrives on societal 
cleavages. The inability of the state to deal with this agility has resulted in 
responses that target the “low hanging fruit”. In Kenya, these responses have 
gone with the obvious threat of Al Shabaab in neighbouring Somali and the 
assumption that there are identity based loyalties from Somalis everywhere66. As 
argued in the article these securitising moves on societies have gendered 
ramifications that entrench exclusion rather enable long-term possibilities of de-
securitisation.  
 
This article also draws attention to the referent object in securitisation 
processes, which is often the state and entities that are able to substantively 
produce themselves as security actors. The inability of the Somali nation in 
Kenya to produce itself as a security actor facing an existential threat means 
their experience of the securitization process is rendered normal. Consequently, 
this powerlessness combined with the securitisation of their identity results in 
the deliberate identification of non-hegemonic Somali men as targets to be dealt 
with as part of the larger security threat identified by the state. In this instance, 
extraordinary circumstances utilized by the regime due to violent extremism 
also exercises the right to take life and/or rob individuals of their humanity. The 
use of targeted violence, incarceration and management of inner city boundaries 
as explored in this article become useful tools to achieve these goals. 67 By 
drawing attention to the people at the centre of a securitisation narrative, I move 
away from the abstract object -  the state - as the target of an existential threat, to 
an analysis of threatened identities and therefore new regimes of masculinities 
produced by terror discourses.  It enables an expansion of what we conceptually 
consider the “objects” that can face an existential threat and generate sufficient 
authority to securitise the source of the threat.  
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